CITY OF DAVIS FIRE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL DEPARTMENT TRAINING BULLETIN



TB 18-004

April 24, 2018

- TO: All Members
- FROM: Daryl C. Arbuthnott, Fire Chief

SUBECT: LAW ENFORCEMENT – TACTICAL MASS CASUALTY INCIDENTS



TABLE OF CONTENTS

- 1. Tactical Law Enforcement Incidents
- 2. Fire Department Response and Initial Actions
- 3. Incident Command
- 4. Fire Suppression
- 5. Rescue Task Forces
- 6. Tactical Emergency Casualty Care (TECC)
- 7. Tactical Emergency Medical Support (TEMS)
- 8. Intelligence Officer
- 9. LawEnforcementTactics
- 10. Zone and Perimeter Concepts
- 11. Tactical Areas
- 12. Glossary of Terms

CITY OF DAVIS

 $P \; \text{OLICY} \quad 1 \; 8 \; \text{-} \; 0 \; 0 \; 4$

I. TACTICAL LAW ENFORCEMENT INCIDENTS

Local law enforcement agencies respond to thousands of incidents on a daily basis, most of which are handled without the need for a fire department response. Of those incidents that involve a joint fire and police response, the majority are resolved by the first responding units and do not present a significant threat to first responders or the public.

Occasionally, incidents occur wherein the actions of one or more subjects present a significant threat to the public and first responders. Although the circumstances can vary, for the sake of this discussion, these incidents are termed tactical law enforcement incidents. Such incidents are among the most dangerous a fire department can respond to and require specific joint training, special planning and coordination.

Tactical law enforcement incidents may include the following:

- Any incident where the subject(s) of an actual or potential violent crime is believed to still be on scene and not in police custody
- Active shooter
- Hostage taker
- Perimeter search for an individual suspected of a violent crime
- Barricaded suspect
- Multiple-coordinated assaults by suspected terrorists (i.e. Mumbai-style attack)
- Any incident where the subject(s) threatens to detonate explosives or set fire to a structure.

The frequency of active shooter and mass casualty incidents (AS/MCI) has led to the assembly of a number of public safety organizations representing various disciplines to share and develop strategies for combating the problem. One group, convened by the American College of Surgeons and the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Hartford, Connecticut, developed a concept document for the purpose of increasing survivability in mass casualty shootings. The paper, known as the Hartford Consensus, describes methods to minimize loss of life in these incidents.

The Hartford Consensus, as a core requirement in response to AS/MCI, identifies the importance of hemorrhage control as an initial action. Experience has shown that the number one cause of preventable death in victims of penetrating trauma is hemorrhage.

The Hartford Consensus focuses on early hemorrhage control to improve survivability. The Hartford Consensus' practical recommendations include the actions contained in the acronym THREAT:

- T Threat Suppression
- H Hemorrhage control
- RE Rapid Extraction to safety
- A Assessment by medical providers
- T Transport to definitive care

The THREAT concepts are simple, basic and proven. The Hartford Consensus identifies that life-threatening bleeding from extremity wounds are best controlled by the use of tourniquets and direct pressure. Internal bleeding resulting from penetrating wounds to the chest and trunk are best addressed through expedited transportation to a hospital.

The recommendations in this training bulletin are consistent with the Hartford Consensus. These recommendations are intended to minimize loss of life by expediting the delivery of critically needed medical care to patients that could otherwise be beyond the reach of traditional EMS providers, or otherwise not receive care within the timeframe necessary to be life-saving.

NOTE: The information presented in this training bulletin applies to dynamic incidents, wherein the subject(s) are believed to still be on scene and not in police custody. The information presented herein does not apply necessarily to routine "shooting" incidents where the subject has fled prior to fire department arrival. This information is intended to serve as a guideline and in no way intends to be all-inclusive or restrict the decisions of fire department command officers.

II. FIRE DEPARTMENT RESPONSE AND INITIAL ACTIONS

When arriving at the scene of a tactical law enforcement incident, it is important for fire department personnel to ascertain if the incident remains dynamic (i.e., subject(s) still on scene and not in police custody). If the incident is dynamic, this information should be communicated to responding emergency response resources immediately (e.g., "Davis from Engine 31, please advise responding units that the shooter is still on scene and to stage at Fifth and "B" Street."). If no law enforcement is on scene and there is any uncertainty about their response, immediately advise dispatch of the situation and request law enforcement response.

Department personnel should not enter the immediate area (hot zone) where

a direct threat is believed to exist. This may be best determined by the sound of gunfire, smoke, or locations from which occupants are fleeing. However, if there is a basis to believe that the threat is no longer present, it may be appropriate for fire department personnel to render aid or take other appropriate action, even prior to the arrival of law enforcement. Extreme caution should be exercised when on scene of a violent incident when law enforcement has not yet arrived.

When dispatch receives a call for a shooting and determines that shooting is ongoing (i.e., an active shooter incident), the following resources reflect an "Active Shooter" response:

- 2 Battalion Chiefs (1 Staff Chief Officer) if available
- 3 Engines
- 4 Ambulances
- 1. The first arriving fire department unit on scene should:
 - Attempt to confirm the nature of the incident (i.e., active shooter, barricaded suspect, hostage taker, etc.).
 - Provide a size-up to dispatch and responding units.
 - Designate a staging area. Consider an area not in direct line of sight or immediately proximate to the incident, with a clear approach to the incident, or possibly a predetermined area developed from preplanning, or determined by law enforcement.
 - > Attempt to locate or identify an available law enforcement unit.
- 2. The first arriving Battalion Chief shall:
 - Establish command for fire department resources and <u>co-locate</u> with law enforcement (LE).
 - Meet with the on scene and in-charge law enforcement agency and <u>establish Unified Command</u>.
 - Work with law enforcement to identify <u>Hot Zone</u>, possibly by making use of a map or drawing, and ensure no fire department personnel enter that area.
 - After identifying the Hot Zone, identify working areas, <u>create</u> <u>Rescue Task Force (RTFs)</u> from the initial responding resources, and secure force protection.
 - Identify Warm Zones for Rescue Task Force (RTFs) deployment. RTFs are discussed in greater detail in Section V of this document. RTFs are small groups of fire department personnel blended together with Force Protection (LE) configured to treat or extract the injured from within the Warm Zone to a Casualty Collection Point (CCP). A CCP is a location to which the injured can be taken prior to further movement to the treatment area.

- Once Unified Command <u>declares work zones</u>, provide RTF <u>briefing</u>.
- Request additional resources for patient treatment, transport, fire and explosive hazards.
- Direct dispatch to <u>create a geographical tactical area</u> for the incident perimeter.
- > Request private ambulance company supervisor.
- 3. Once an active shooter or mass casualty incident is confirmed, immediately assign second Battalion Chief as Operations or Rescue Group Supervisor.
- 4. The first arriving Paramedic ambulance or AMR Supervisor should normally be assigned as Patient Transport Leader.
- 5. Consider assigning succeeding Chiefs or Company Officers to manage Medical Group. An AMR representative may serve as an assistant but should not be assigned in a position of directly supervising uniformed personnel.
- 6. First arriving Company Officers should prepare personnel and secure equipment for deployment as a RTF. Recommended protective equipment should consist of Kevlar helmet, ballistic vest and a radio. The outer most garment should be the ballistic vest.

Tactical law enforcement incidents can take several hours to resolve. Although the scene may appear to be static, until the suspect is in police custody or confirmed down, these incidents present the potential to turn deadly without notice. It is essential that fire department members remain alert to their surroundings and closely monitor all developments.

III. INCIDENT COMMAND

The necessities of a dynamic tactical law enforcement incident will vary. The immediate establishment of Unified Command and designation of clear incident objectives early on will aid in bringing order to what is usually a chaotic situation. For complex incidents that involve a significant commitment of fire resources, a Unified Command shall be employed and an Incident Action Plan (IAP) shall be developed. This must take place as soon as practical and may be informal.

The joint law enforcement and fire/EMS elements of the IAP may vary based on the situation, but key components that the fire department will be responsible for include the following:

1. <u>Rescue Group</u>

i. A Rescue Group is configured to extract viable patients from the Warm Zone or Casualty Collection Point to the treatment areas.

- ii. If no Warm Zone or CCP exists, the Triage Unit Leader will have the responsibility of coordinating the movement of patients to treatment areas.
- 2. Medical Group
 - i. A Medical Group is configured to manage the triage, treatment, and transportation of casualties.
 - ii. When large numbers of patients are encountered, or are separated by a distance making it impractical to have one treatment area, a Medical Branch may be established which will result in Medical Groups configured under a Medical Branch Director.
- 3. Fire Group
 - i. A Fire Group is configured to suppress potential fires and coordinate the non EMS operational fire discipline needs of an incident.
 - ii. Additional groups (i.e., US&R Group, Haz Mat Group, etc.) may need to be developed based upon the needs of the incident.
- 4. Communications Plan
 - i. Ensures all resources are on the appropriate channels for law and fire communications (i.e., tactical, command, etc.).

The following are additional incident command activities during response to tactical law enforcement incidents.

- i. Confirm the nature of the incident. Avoid assumptions. Verify and confirm the location of known threats.
- ii. Confirm if anyone needs medical care. Attempt to identify and track the number of injured. Are any officers or first responders injured?
- iii. Provide "Dispatch" with a size-up and request additional resources, as needed
 - 1. For operational security, consider providing a more detailed sizeup via cell phone.
- iv. Designate or confirm the safe location of Staging Area(s).
- v. Assess if the Command Post (CP) is in a safe location.
 - 1. If no CP is established, the fire agency may need to establish the initial CP.
 - 2. Consider Force Protection at the CP.
- vi. Develop incident objectives.
- vii. Develop an organization to support the IAP and incident objectives.
- viii. Consider EMS resource(s) for the exclusive needs of law enforcement.
- ix. Consider requesting an Intelligence Officer. (See Section VIII of this document)
- x. Identify specific incident boundaries and locations. This will be of much


utility as additional fire department command officers arrive and RTFs are configured to search for victims.


- xi. Consider designating the following locations on a map.
 - 1. Location of the threat(s) (Hot Zone)
 - 2. Perimeter established by law enforcement (Warm Zone)
 - 3. Casualty Collection Point (Warm Zone)
 - 4. Treatment Area (Cold Zone)
 - 5. Incident Command Post (Cold Zone)
 - 6. Staging Area(s) (Cold Zone)
 - 7. Tactical Operations Center or (TOC), where some SWAT operations are coordinated from. A TOC is not co-located with the CP, nor is it an official position in ICS. If established, it is extremely beneficial for a fire command officer to be assigned to obtain real-time situational awareness.
 - 8. Family Assistance Center (Cold Zone)
- xii. Confirm that open corridors exist between areas where fire department vehicles may need to respond to access the CCP or treatment area(s) and the path away from the incident area when transporting to the hospital.
- xiii. For protracted incidents, consider the need for feeding and relief.

Incident command structure for tactical law enforcement incidents may vary based on incident complexities. For complex incidents, the command structure may include the following components. (See example on next page)

Basic ICS organization chart for a mass casualty incident.

Example 1





Expanded ICS organization chart for mass casualty incidents.

The above illustrated command structures are conceptual and are intended only to show how an organization may be structured to manage tactical law enforcement incidents. In Example 1, groups are organized by function. In Example 2, two of the branches are designated based on geographic locations. During actual incidents, positions and functions that do not appear above may need to be designated.

IV. FIRE SUPPRESSION

It is not uncommon for a barricaded suspect to threaten to set fire to a building. When a barricaded suspect threatens to set fire to a building, it is vital that the Incident Commander develop a Fire Plan.

If a fire occurs and the suspect's location cannot be determined, firefighters will need to protect exposures to the extent possible and attempt to extinguish the

fire from protected locations. When no other options are available, water drops via helicopter can be made to control the spread of a fire when approach by firefighters is unsafe. Helicopter operations must be closely coordinated.

NOTE: Under no circumstances should firefighters enter or move through a Hot Zone to deploy ladders, hose lines, or other equipment.

V. RESCUE TASK FORCES (RTF)

A Rescue Task Force (RTF) is a team deployed to provide point of wound care to victims where there is an ongoing ballistic or explosive threat (i.e., active shooter or terrorist event). These teams treat, stabilize, and remove the injured from the Warm Zone to an area where they can receive definitive care and/or transport to the hospital while wearing ballistic protective equipment with force protection.

At a minimum, RTF complements shall consist of no less than two (2) firefighters and (3) three law enforcement officers. Under ideal circumstances, RTF should consist of a minimum of (3) firefighters and (4) law enforcement officers. Incident circumstances and available personnel will dictate the number and size of RTFs. The following are possible RTF configurations:



- 1. The first example illustrates the minimum staffing of an RTF. This is the likely RTF staffing configuration for small voluntary agencies. These agencies will have to determine which minimum staffing configuration is sufficient.
- 2. In the second example, a third fire department member is added. This is the minimum configuration for urban agencies as it allows for two members to carry the victim and the Officer to coordinate direction with the law enforcement team leader.
- In the third example, staffing configuration provides sufficient staffing for the RTF and is considered as ideal as law enforcement coverage is sufficient.
- 4. In the fourth example, additional firefighters are added to extract more victims; however, more personnel attached to a single RTF places a burden on the ability for rapid team movement.

RTFs must be able to move quickly. As such, it is generally not advisable for RTFs to be equipped with defibrillators, large drug boxes, gurneys, or other equipment that can affect their agility. RTFs may carry modified configurations of equipment to provide increased mobility and enhanced hemorrhage control and airway management. This will allow coverage of a larger area and greater protection to the assigned personnel. Note: Some of this equipment is carried on ALS resources and may be pre-packaged. Examples of recommended equipment include:

- Tourniquets
- Hemostatic Gauze
- Kerlex[®]
- 4x4s
- Abdominal Pads
- Ace Wraps
- Chest seals
- Bag-Valve-Mask
- Saline
- Gloves
- Litter (SKED[®])
- Nitrile Gloves
- Space Blanket

It is important to emphasize once RTFs are being configured, lives may be at extreme risk, and therefore the grouping of RTFs must be performed with a sense of urgency. Discipline must be maintained with the highest level of alertness to their surroundings. When configuring RTFs, prior to executing any missions or deployments, it is highly advisable to have them assemble at a Staging Area for a mission briefing and updated intelligence.

When RTFs are operating within a Warm Zone, treat that area as an IDLH. No triage is to be conducted as the primary mission is extraction. The first RTFs will enter the area and quickly assess patients for survivability and extraction. Patient able to walk without assistance should be directed to self-evacuate to safe areas; dead patients must be left in place. RTF members are expected to begin immediate extraction of the injured. Additional RTFs should primarily focus on extraction or if needed, be sent into unreached areas determined by the initial RTFs.

Prior experience has indicated the value of creating a Rescue Group and designating a Rescue Group Supervisor to coordinate and/or oversee the activities of the RTFs. It may be advisable for the Rescue Group Supervisor to co-locate with the law enforcement command officer coordinating tactical

operations and/or possibly accompany the RTFs as they make entry to conduct RTF activities. Although the majority of active shooter incidents present a decreased threat upon entry of fire personnel, as RTFs move through areas in search of victims, it is advisable to maintain LCES (Lookout, Communications, Escape Routes, and a Safe Refuge). Special attention should be given to suspicious devices, evidence, etc.

VI. TACTICAL EMERGENCY CASUALTY CARE (TECC)

The TECC guidelines are the civilian counterpart to the U.S. Military's Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC) guidelines. The TECC guidelines take into account the specific needs of civilian EMS providers serving civilian populations. The TECC guidelines were developed for military personnel who deploy in support of combat operations. These guidelines have proven extraordinarily successful, and provide the foundations for TECC.

TECC focuses primarily on the intrinsic tactical variables of penetrating trauma compounded by prolonged evacuation times. The principle mandate of TECC is the critical execution of the right interventions at the right time.

Indirect Threat Care is rendered once the casualty is no longer under fire (i.e., Warm zone). Medical equipment is limited to that which is carried into the field by RTF personnel typically including tourniquets, large trauma dressings and adjunct airways.

VII. TACTICAL EMERGENCY MEDICAL SUPPORT (TEMS)

Tactical Emergency Medical Support (TEMS) is the provision of preventative urgent and emergent medical care during high-risk, extended duration and mission-driven law enforcement special operations.

Tier 3 is the TEMS First Responder Operations (TEMS FRO). Fire department personnel will receive 4 hours of tactical awareness training enabling them to function as responders at the TEMS FRO level. All training at the FRO level and higher allows members to be assigned to a RTF. Much of Yolo County fire agencies will be operating under Tier 3 FRO.

Tier 2 is the TEMS Technician. Technicians are paramedics that have attended the same approved TEMS course as Specialists, but have not attended a SWAT course.

VIII. HANDLING INTELLIGENCE

Detailed tactical information should never be broadcasted over the radio. It is always advisable to communicate sensitive information via cell phone or face-to-face.

IX. LAW ENFORCEMENT TACTICS

The close coordination necessary during an active shooter incident accentuates the importance of fire department personnel having a general understanding of law enforcement tactics when responding to law enforcement type incidents.

When responding to an active shooter incident, arriving law enforcement officers are trained to use a tactic known as "Immediate Action/Rapid Deployment" (IARD). IARD is defined as "the swift and immediate deployment of law enforcement resources to ongoing, life threatening situations where delayed deployment could otherwise result in death or serious bodily injury to innocent persons".

With IARD, the first arriving officers form into two, three, or four-person Contact Teams to locate the shooter(s) with specific intent to stop the deadly threat. As additional officers arrive, they will either be formed into additional Contact Teams or Rescue Teams. Rescue Teams (law enforcement officers only) are configured to search for and rescue the injured. When fire department personnel are joined together with these Rescue Teams, they are designated as Rescue Task Forces.

After the initial Contact Team has been deployed, the next senior officer on scene may establish command. The primary objectives of the law enforcement incident command are:

- Locate shooter(s) and stop the deadly behavior
- Rescue all victims
- Isolate and contain the incident
- Assess other potential threats
- Preserve and investigate the scene

X. ZONES AND PERIMETER CONCEPTS

The **Hot Zone** is that area wherein <u>a direct and immediate threat exists</u>. What constitutes a direct and immediate threat is subjectively determined and depends on current circumstances. Any unsearched area where a threat may be present should be considered a Hot Zone. Any area within direct line of fire or where a

gunman may be located or can easily move to should also be considered a Hot Zone. Due to the potential danger, <u>the Hot Zone shall be treated as an Immediate</u> <u>Danger to Life and Health</u> (IDLH).

The **Warm Zone** is that area wherein a <u>potential threat exists</u>; <u>however</u>, the <u>threat may not be direct or immediate</u>. For example, an area already searched by law enforcement officers could still be within the range of gunfire and/or a subject could be hiding in an unsearched area or return to an area that has been searched. Such an area would not be designated as a Cold Zone until the subject's apprehension or after a thorough search has been conducted. Due to the potential danger, <u>the Warm Zone shall be treated as an IDLH</u>.

No fire personnel shall operate within the Warm Zone without Force Protection. Fire department personnel may operate for a short period of time within the Warm Zone once formed into RTFs with Force Protection. Under such circumstances, RTFs may attempt to locate and extract the injured to an area where they can be treated, and to quickly stabilize the seriously or critically injured prior to extraction. In the Warm Zone, the extent of medical intervention must be carefully weighed against the dynamic risks of operating in this area.

The **Cold Zone** is that area where <u>no significant danger or potential threat is</u> <u>reasonably anticipated.</u> Factors may include distance, time, physical barriers, terrain or type of firepower used. The Cold Zone is the appropriate location for treatment of patients, staging and command functions.

Other terms familiar to law enforcement officers are *inner* and *outer perimeter*, *cover* and *concealment*. The inner perimeter is generally a geographically defined area in which subjects are contained, with entrance and egress controlled by the Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team. The outer perimeter is a larger area encompassing the inner perimeter, which is controlled by the law enforcement agency and from which the public is excluded. For the sake of fire department operations, the inner perimeter should be considered an IDLH.

Cover is defined as an area where adequate protection from live fire exists. Concealment is defined as an area where visual concealment exists. The wall of a structure that bullets or shrapnel could penetrate may provide concealment, but would not provide cover.

Resist the temptation to think of the Hot and Warm Zone, or IDLH as contiguous, concentric circles surrounding a crisis site. In a sniper incident or incident involving high caliber weapons, there could be pockets of Hot Zones several blocks away from the gunman's position. On the other hand, the cover afforded

by some neighboring buildings could provide pockets of Warm or Cold Zones relatively close to the subject.

XI. TACTICAL AREAS

An additional challenge that can present itself when managing a tactical law enforcement incident, particularly when a large area is impacted, is safely responding to unrelated incidents that occur in close proximity. When a tactical law enforcement incident impacts an area several city blocks in size or a large public venue and when a long time frame is anticipated for incident resolution, it may be advisable for the fire department to designate a tactical area. Designating a tactical area with dispatch allows the Incident Commander to control any responses into what could be designated as a Warm Zone.

When implemented, the specific geographic boundaries need to be determined, and this information provided to dispatch. This allows any calls for service that originate from within the tactical area to be communicated to the Command Post for dispatch. In such circumstances, fire department resources from outside the area will not be dispatched to an incident in close proximity to a dangerous situation.

In determining whether or not a tactical area should be designated, consider the following:

- 1. Is the suspect's location known or unknown?
- 2. Are there multiple suspects?
- 3. Is the suspect confined to a small area (i.e., house, apartment building, etc.) or does the suspect have access to a large area (i.e., several city blocks)?
- 4. Does the suspect's actions (i.e., numerous shots fired, etc.) potentially threaten an area well beyond his or her location, if known?
- 5. Can fire resources safely respond to adjacent streets?

If designating a tactical area is necessary, it may be advisable to request additional resources and configure an additional RTF for the exclusive purpose of responding to unrelated incidents in close proximity to the original incident. Any responses within the tactical area must be closely coordinated. As with other RTFs, it is advisable to provide a mission briefing and updated intelligence.

XII. Protective Equipment (PE)

A. Most fire departments in the region are pursuing the purchase of certified Kevlar helmets and ballistic vests for firefighters. These items will be purchased based on positions, not individuals.

- B. The wearing of PEs are based on the call type.
 - Shooting Members are only required to wear ballistic vest and may don their brush jacket as the outermost garment.
 - Active Shooter(s) Members are to wear both the ballistic vest and Kevlar helmet, with no brush jacket.

XIII. Glossary of Terms

- A. Active Shooter: Any armed person who uses or has used deadly physical force on other persons and continues to do so while having unrestricted access to additional victims.
- B. Casualty Collection Point (CCP): The area outside the Hot Zone to which casualties are taken to initiate treatment in the case of critical injuries, or be further extracted to treatment areas by Rescue Task Force members.
- C. Concealment: A term popular among law enforcement officers that refers to a location that hides an individual from view, but that does not provide protection from small arms fire.
- D. Contact Team: Initial team of up to 4 police officers who immediately form at the scene of an active shooter and deploy to the shooter's location with the goal of initiating contact to contain or eliminate the threat.
- E. Cover: A term popular among law enforcement officers that refers to a location that hides an individual from view, and that provides protection from small arms fire. A stone or concrete wall, or tree of at least two feet in diameter would provide cover from most small arms fire. To obtain cover from high-powered weapons fire, much more substantial barriers would be needed.
- F. Hot Zone: Area where a known direct and immediate threat exists (i.e., any uncontrolled area where a gunman could directly engage first responders is a Hot Zone).
- G. Warm Zone: Area where a potential threat exists, but the threat is not direct or immediate. An area that has been preliminarily "cleared" by law enforcement officers would be a Warm Zone.
- H. Cold Zone: Area where no significant danger or threat can be reasonably anticipated. An area that has been comprehensively "searched" by law enforcement officers would be a Cold Zone.
- I. Immediate Action Rapid Deployment (IARD): The swift and immediate deployment of law enforcement resources to ongoing, life threatening situations where delayed deployment could otherwise result in death or serious bodily injury to innocent persons.
- J. Multi-Assault Counter-Terrorism Action Capabilities (MACTAC): Specialized law enforcement tactics designed to enable officers to immediately deploy contact teams or squads to locate, move to, and neutralize violent assaults and/or terrorist acts.

- K. Rescue Team: Team of up to 4 police officers who form at the scene of an active shooter and deploy behind Contact Teams into the Hot Zone with the goal of extracting viable patients to a Casualty Collection Point or treatment area.
- L. Rescue Task Force: A combination of fire department and police deployed to identify, quickly stabilize the critically injured, and extract them from the Warm Zone to an area where they can receive definitive care and/or transport to the hospital.
- M. Tactical Emergency Medical Support (TEMS): The provision of preventative urgent medical care during high-risk, extended duration and mission-driven law enforcement special operations.

Conclusion

Mass casualty incidents are challenging for both small and large law enforcement and Fire/EMS agencies. Those agencies that perform most effectively have participated in multi-agency repetitive training exercises. With the Department's purchase of ballistic vest and helmets and ongoing inter-agency training, members can be assured the results will be favorable to all parties involved.

Daryl C. Arbuthnott, Fire Chief Davis